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Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the audit committee (AC)
independence, financial expertise, internal audit function, audit quality and ownership concentration on
earnings quality (EQ) and, consequently, ascertain whether the AC’s independence and financial
expertise has a moderating effect on the relationship between internal audit function and EQ.
Design/methodology/approach – The study sample is 508 firms listed on the Main Market of Bursa
Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the years 2009 to 2012. EQ was
measured using two modified Jones models of discretionary accruals.
Findings – The findings reveal that the independence of AC and investment in internal audit function,
as well as the Big4 audit firm, are related to greater EQ. Ownership concentration is found to be
associated with lower EQ. The study provides evidence that AC’s independence moderates the
relationship between internal audit function (investment in and sourcing arrangements of internal audit
function) and EQ. It also shows that AC’s financial expertise moderates the relationship between
sourcing arrangements of internal audit function and EQ.
Practical implications – This study extends the prior related literature by examining the AC’s
independence and financial expertise as moderating variables on the relationship between internal
audit function and EQ.
Social implications – Policymakers might use the findings regarding EQ in relation to governance
practices, to recognize the important roles played by the AC’s independence and financial expertise on
the effectiveness of internal audit function with EQ.
Originality/value – This study uses the agency theory and resource dependence theory to provide
empirical evidence on the impact of internal audit function and AC on EQ in the ownership concentration
environment.
Keywords Malaysia, Ownership concentration, Earnings quality, Audit committees,
Discretionary accruals, Internal audit function
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The world financial crisis emphasised and drew attention on the importance of
transparency for promoting fair competition, investment and improving confidence on the
public and corporate sectors’ accountability (Nam and Nam, 2004). Therefore, the failures
of publicly known businesses, such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat, among others,
have shed light on corporate governance reforms on a global scale (Kim, 2008). Special
attention has been given to key players in the corporate governance, such as the
effectiveness of the audit committee (AC), internal audit and external audit quality. The
ultimate objective of corporate governance is to produce reliable financial reports, upon
which the investment decisions can be taken to produce sufficient returns (Bin-Zulkafli
et al., 2007). According to Klein (2002), effective corporate governance is required to
reduce the opportunistic behaviour of managers to manage earnings and would lead to the
improvement in financial reporting quality.
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Generally speaking, earnings management (EM) is evidenced by earnings quality (EQ),
where higher EM leads to lower EQ and vice versa. Management gets involved in EM for
several reasons, including to minimize political costs (Warfield et al., 1995), to steer clear
of default in debt covenant (Klein, 2002; Davidson et al., 2005) and to maximize manager’s
wealth (Radzi et al., 2011). There has been increasing investors’ concern over EM following
the major accounting scandals, and for this reason, a great demand for EQ is notable for
the purpose of improving the quality of financial reporting (Bedard and Johnstone, 2004).
Specific aspects like discretionary accruals (DAs) have garnered attention as significant
EQ indicators. In this regard, high EQ and transparency in financial reporting and in
auditing are all significant in obtaining the confidence of stakeholders. Based on the
agency theory view, the internal monitoring mechanisms, such as the AC and internal audit
function (IAF), are considered as important monitoring mechanisms to safeguard the
interests of the shareholders.
During the adoption and reinforcement of corporate governance practices, the East Asian
countries (including Malaysia) have experienced certain problems, as the economies of
these countries have particular characteristics. For example, the level of ownership is
highly concentrated, the government intervenes excessively, legal systems and
enforcement are weak, low quality of information and legal structures and institutions are
not well developed, all of which pose particular and challenging difficulties for the
enhancement of effective governance practices (Hashim, 2009; Nam and Nam, 2004). In
the case of Malaysia, a series of revised corporate governance codes was introduced to
improve the corporate governance practices (MCCG, 2000, revised MCCG 2007, and
MCCG 2012).
The ownership structure in Malaysian listed companies may also have contributed to this
crisis (Nam and Nam, 2004). According to Thillainathan (1999), shareholdings in Malaysian
corporations are often concentrated via cross-holdings and a pyramid structure, where the
controlling shareholders can be individuals or families having over 50 per cent ownership,
which constitutes a scenario that could cause deficiencies in corporate governance.
Claessens et al. (2000) found that Malaysia ranks the third out of the nine East Asian
Countries in terms of concentration of ownership control.
Previous studies in Malaysia have shown the existence of high agency problem (Kallunki
et al., 2007), high EM practices (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006, Ardekani et al., 2012) and
high insider trading (Ali et al., 2011) among firms. Specifically, in the same context, Saleh
et al. (2005) noted that poor corporate governance could be the cause of higher EM in
Malaysia. Fan and Wong (2002) found that the accounting earnings informativeness is
lower for East Asian firms including Malaysia, whose controlling shareholders have higher
voting rights and higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights. This
ensures the importance of examining the impact of the governance monitoring of the
financial reporting quality in this environment (Kallunki et al., 2007). The MCCG has
emphasized the important role of AC and IAF as monitoring mechanisms to enhance the
quality of financial reporting.
Therefore, it is important to examine the influence of such mechanisms on the level of EQ
in Malaysian listed firms. Thus, this study would provide answers to the questions of
whether AC’s independence (ACIND), financial expertise (ACEXPERT), IAF, external audit
quality (Big4) and ownership concentration (OWCO) affect EQ and, consequently,
ascertain whether the AC has a moderating effect on the relationship between IAF and EQ.
In this study, the main objective is to investigate the effect of ACIND and ACEXPER, IAF and
Big4, as governance monitoring mechanisms that are responsible to evaluate the quality of
financial reporting. The study found that ACIND, investment in IAF and Big4 are related to
higher EQ. However, the study reveals that OWCO is related to lower EQ. In addition, the
study found that high EQ is achieved by having high ACIND and ACEXPERT, as well as by
having a high investment in IAF.



































This study extends prior related literature by examining whether or not the ACIND and
ACEXPERT moderate the relationship between IAF (sourcing arrangements and investment
in IAF) and EQ. In addition, prior studies (Porta et al., 1999; Fan and Wong, 2002; Yunos
et al., 2010; Kamardin and Haron, 2011; Abdullah and Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman and Ali,
2006) evidenced the impact of OWCO on the monitoring mechanisms and on EQ.
Therefore, in this study, we investigate the effect of OWCO (five largest shareholders) upon
the EQ among Malaysian firms listed in the Main Market.
This study is organized into seven sections. Section 1 is the introduction, which provides
research questions, objectives, background, motivation, theoretical and empirical
motivation and the contributions to the literature. Section 2 covers the corporate
governance, ownership concentration, accounting and auditing reforms in Malaysia.
Section 3 presents the study’s theoretical framework. Section 4 presents the literature
review and hypotheses development. This section provides literature review on EQ
followed by a discussion of the theory and related empirical studies on the study variables.
The research design, data analysis technique and the models used to test the hypotheses
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the empirical findings and discussion. This
study concludes in Section 7 with a discussion and summary of the findings, study
implications, limitations and recommendations for future research.
2. Corporate governance reforms in Malaysia
The government of Malaysia adopted specific steps to enhance its corporate governance
and to improve the financial reporting quality among Malaysian firms. This led to the
establishment of the Malaysian Code on corporate governance in March 2000. This code
emphasizes the role of board of directors, accountability, shareholders and remuneration
of directors. The Code was revised in 2007 and became known as the revised MCCG 2007
to accommodate, among others, higher internal monitoring control and the members of AC
to only include non-executive directors. The internal auditor directly reports to the AC to
acknowledge and tackle risks (Hassan et al., 2010). Added to this, the Code was revised
again in 2012 and became known as the MCCG 2012. The latest Code gives more
emphasis on the board composition and structure and the board process, where the
director is mandated to ensure the strength of an effective governance structure to
accommodate risk and internal control management. In this regard, IAF has become
significant as an internal monitoring corporate governance mechanism (Al-Shetwi et al.,
2011). These reforms are considered critical, considering the presence of high ownership
concentration in Malaysia. High ownership concentration might lead firms to not gain the
advantage of corporate governance because of the failure to detect EM (Park and Shin,
2004). In addition, Hu et al. (2010) and Setia-Atmaja (2009) posit that major shareholders
may have a tendency to select a weak governance structure and appoint less independent
directors on the board.
3. Theoretical framework
The agency theory posits that increased internal control system could result in increased
monitoring of the company processes, and this, in turn, would support and increase the
financial information outcomes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency theory also
postulates that independent directors and auditors are the main corporate monitoring
mechanism used to minimize the agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). By
monitoring the behaviour and controlling the executive directors’ actions, independent
directors can curb the agency conflict between owners and managers (Benkraiem, 2009),
while at the same time, a good level of monitoring enables the principals to be aware of the
opportunistic behaviour and to hold the agents accountable if they are less motivated to
conduct such behaviour. Therefore, the resource dependence theory emphasizes that
independent directors on the firm are very important for enhancing internal monitoring
effectiveness, and the independent directors and auditors could protect firms’ resources



































and reduce information asymmetry by improving the information flow between the firms and
stakeholders (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). In Malaysia, the weak corporate governance
contributes to high conflict of interests between majority and minority shareholders
(Kallunki et al., 2007; Fan and Wong 2002). The high ownership concentration by family and
managerial ownership and the agency conflict found between minority and majority
shareholders lead to an improvement of corporate governance regulations in Malaysia
(MCCG 2000, revised MCCG 2007 and MCCG 2012), which focus on the internal and
external monitoring mechanisms to safeguard the interest of minority shareholders. Thus,
listed firms are required to have an effective monitoring mechanism to ensure the high
quality of financial reporting, which in turn minimizes information asymmetry and agency
conflict between management and shareholders and between minority and majority
shareholders.
4. Empirical literature review and hypotheses development
4.1 Investment in internal audit function
The role of IAF is to enhance the internal control system. Garcia et al. (2012) and Adiguzel
(2013) reported that companies having internal audit function had higher EQ than
companies without IAF. According to Prawitt et al. (2009), IAF that is well invested in is likely
to be able to detect and prevent material misstatements. However, Davidson et al. (2005)
found an insignificant relationship between internal audit function and EM. Therefore,
investing in the IAF indicates that competent internal audit personnel will be able to assist
management in establishing considerable controls over financial reporting and to minimize
the occurrence of control issues (Lin et al., 2011). In other words, increased investments in
IAF allow the internal audit department to employ and maintain skilled workers.
In Malaysia, the revised MCCG 2007 elaborates the IAF’s roles and responsibilities. The
Code mandates that the establishment of an IAF is accountable to the AC, who is
responsible for the recognition and management of risks. Yasin and Nelson (2012) reported
a positive relationship between external audit quality and IAF cost. Additionally, a negative
and significant relationship between IAF and the absolute value of DAs (proxy of EQ) was
reported by Johl et al. (2013). Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015a, 2015c) also found a
significant and negative relationship. Thus, a higher investment in the IAF implies that firms
have more competent IAF personnel to help the management establish stronger controls
over financial reporting. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H1. Investment in internal audit function is positively associated with earnings quality.
4.2 Sourcing arrangements of internal audit function
IAF can be employed through internal employees with the help of the internal audit
department, or it can be outsourced to professional firms (Carcello et al., 2005; Desai et al.,
2011). An internal audit that is outsourced is described as where the functions of the
internal audit are undertaken by a third party (Carcello et al., 2005; Desai et al., 2011).
Bursa Malaysia mandates listed firms to disclose whether their IAF is employed in-house or
outsourced. Several studies found that the former type of IAF results in a higher internal
oversight and control over audit processes, hence safeguarding the confidential
information and providing a better insight into the business process and related risks from
the environment and non-employees. It also serves as a learning opportunity for the
employees of the organization (Vecchio and Clinton, 2003; Rittenberg, 1999). Some of the
advantages of this type of audit function are in-depth knowledge, loyalty and crisis situation
handling (e.g. fraud) (Spekle et al., 2007).
Contrastingly, outsourced IAF proponents claimed that the in-house internal auditors are
not as independent as their outsourced counterparts and that it is challenging for an
employee to be totally independent from the firm’s management (James, 2003; Ahlawat
and Lowe, 2004). However, some external auditors believe internal auditors to be more



































objective and independent in their decisions when they are not working for the company
(Gramling and Hermanson, 2006). Mansor et al. (2013) reported that the in-house internal
audit function is related to a decrease in EM (high EQ). While Al-Rassas and Kamardin
(2015c) found that the outsourced IAF is related to a decreased DA and a higher EQ. On
the basis of the above arguments, this study hypothesizes that:
H2. Sourcing arrangements of internal audit function is associated with earnings quality.
4.3 Audit committee independence
ACs supplement the internal governance mechanisms of the firm by minimizing the
occurrence of conflicts that is innate in the ownership structure (Cai et al., 2015). Judging
from the perspective of the agency theory, the AC’s effectiveness is based on its
characteristics (Ika and Ghazali, 2012; Klein, 2002; Garcia et al., 2012; Vafeas, 2005). It is
important for the members of the AC to be independent from the firm’s management to
perform its functions effectively (Ismail et al., 2009; Krishnamoorthy, 2002). According to Lin
et al. (2006), an AC whose members are mostly independent are more effective in
monitoring management and lessening the potential for erroneous reporting due to the
minimal interference from the management.
Moreover, independent directors bring about high-quality financial reporting (Mustafa and
Youssef, 2010). There are many empirical studies that highlighted the effectiveness that
stem from the independence of the AC. Specifically, Klein (2002), Yang and Krishnan
(2005) and Yunos (2011) revealed that the independence of the AC is related with lower
DAs (proxy of EQ). Such independence is also related with a higher EQ as evidenced by
Bradbury et al. (2006) and Garcia et al. (2012), as well as financial reporting quality as
evidenced by Agrawal and Chadha (2005), Bedard and Johnstone, 2004, Garcia et al.
(2012) and Siagian and Tresnaningsih (2011). Other studies highlighted an insignificant
relationship between AC independence and earnings informativeness (Petra, 2007), DAs
(Adiguzel, 2013; Garcia et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2003) and quality of accruals (Baxter and
Cotter, 2009).
In the context of Malaysian studies, some authors (Saleh et al., 2007; Salleh and Haat, 2014;
Mansor et al., 2013) revealed a negative association between ACIND and EM. On the other
hand, a positive association was evidenced by other authors (Ahmad-Zaluki and
Wan-Hussin, 2010; Al-Rassas and Kamardin 2015b) between independent AC and the
quality of earnings, whereas some others evidenced no significant association between AC
independence and EM (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; Abdullah and Nasir, 2004; Ismail
et al., 2009). According to the agency theory, it is predicted that an independent AC is more
capable of monitoring management behaviour in terms of EM, and thus, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H3. Audit committee independence is positively associated with EQ.
4.4 Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between internal audit
function and earnings quality
The revised MCCG 2007 emphasized the effectiveness of internal monitoring by mandating
Malaysian listed companies to establish IAF that directly coordinates and has regular
meetings with AC, and subsequently, the internal audit report is submitted to the
committee. Consequently, the integrity of financial reporting is the responsibility of the AC.
AC plays an important role as a monitoring device to review the internal auditor’s work.
Having an effective AC can help internal auditors confront management and, thus,
potentially enhance the actual and perceived independence of auditors.
By working closely together, internal auditors and AC can preserve and promote financial
reporting quality (Krishnamoorthy 2002). Scarbrough et al. (1998) showed that AC that
consists solely of independent directors that have a tendency to hold meetings frequently
together with internal auditors to go over their work. Cooper (1993) noted that the head of



































the department of internal audit ought to give account to the AC directly and ought to hold
frequent meetings with the AC. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) indicated that when internal
auditors have good communication with AC, it may result in an improvement in the quality
of corporate governance. From the above arguments, the independence of AC is very
important because independent directors in the AC bring about high-quality IAF and
strengthens internal monitoring and high EQ. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H4. Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between investment in
internal audit function and earnings quality.
H5. Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between sourcing
arrangements of internal audit function and earnings quality.
4.5 Audit committee’s financial expertise
The financial expertise of the AC is significant for the committee’s effectiveness in
enhancing the financial reporting quality. According to the MCCG, there should be at least
a member of the AC that is financially knowledgeable. The resource dependence theory
explains that the AC’s role is to provide resources in the form of expertise and experience
for firms to gain competitive advantage, especially in financial reporting quality. These
experts are expected to mitigate the agency problem that arises from the managers’ ability
to manipulate earnings reports. It is the duty of the AC to perform the assigned task
diligently with the skills, knowledge and expertise that they have acquired to produce
quality financial reporting. Because they indicate support for the financial statement
credibility, ACs having financial expertise have been considered as a strength (Burrowes
and Hendricks, 2005), as they lower EM (Badolato et al., 2014; Baxter and Cotter, 2009;
Chen and Zhou, 2007, He and Yang, 2014; Saleh et al., 2007; Sharma and Kuang, 2014;
Soliman and Ragab, 2014; Yusof, 2010; Xie et al., 2003) and produce high-quality earnings
reporting (Badolato et al., 2014; He and Yang, 2014; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Qin, 2007;
Sharma and Kuang, 2014; Soliman and Ragab, 2014).
In the context of Malaysian firms, Saleh et al. (2007) and Yusof (2010) showed that a
financial expert AC results in high EQ. However, no relationship was found between the
AC’s financial expertise and EQ by Mohamad et al. (2012). On the basis of both the agency
theory and the resource dependence theory, it can be contended that the AC’s financial
expertise lessens the DAs and improves the quality of earnings. Thus, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H6. Audit committee financial expertise is positively associated with earnings quality.
4.6 Audit committee’s financial expertise moderates the relationship between internal
audit function and earnings quality
ACs having financial expertise have been considered effectively strong (Burrowes and
Hendricks, 2005) to lower EM and to achieve high-quality earnings reporting (Badolato
et al., 2014; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; He and Yang, 2014; Sharma and Kuang, 2014; Saleh
et al., 2007; Soliman, and Ragab, 2014; Yusof, 2010). Having financial expertise in the AC
shows that the internal audit programme will be reviewed (Raghunandan et al., 2001), and
this activity decreases the tendency for the misappropriation of assets in companies held
by the company (Mustafa and Youssef, 2010). Indeed, the AC is potentially capable of
improving the IAF effectiveness and the practices of external audit and result in high audit
quality. The presence of EM and weak corporate governance may create a demand for
better monitoring, which would suggest a positive relationship between corporate
governance monitoring and the need for financial experts (Krishnan and Lee, 2009).
Malaysian revised code on corporate governance (MCCG 2007) states that the duty of
internal auditors includes being effective monitoring entities and the head of the internal
audit department who should submit the IAF reports to AC and have regular meetings with



































the committee. Thus, an efficient IAF is commonly a reflection of an effective AC. Hence, the
following hypotheses are proposed:
H7. Audit committee’s financial expertise moderates the relationship between
investment in internal audit function and earnings quality.
H8. Audit committee’s financial expertise moderates the relationship between sourcing
arrangements of internal audit function and earnings quality.
4.7 External audit quality
According to the agency theory, internal and external monitoring mechanisms are required
to reduce the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders, and increasing the
quality of monitoring could reduce the asymmetry of information (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Also, the resource dependence theory proposes that company’s internal and
external monitoring mechanisms that have different knowledge and expertise bring
important resources to the company, which leads to an increase in the firm’s monitoring
and enhances the financial reporting quality (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). External
monitoring mechanisms such as external audit firm are supposed to mitigate EM and
enhance financial reporting quality. Big4 audit firms are commonly used as proxy for
external audit quality, which is considered as an external monitoring mechanism (Fan and
Wong, 2005). Having experts and resources, the Big4 audit firms have more advantages as
compared to their smaller counterparts.
Previous studies recognize that the Big4 audit firms provide higher audit quality and higher
reliability and quality to financial reporting than the non-Big 4 auditors. Krishnan (2003)
showed that Big 4 audit firm can better detect EM as compared to non-Big 4 audit firm; they
found that firms audited by non-Big 4 audit firms have higher levels of EM. This is consistent
with the result of the study by Habib (2011), who found that Big 4 audit firm associates with
less EM. Big4 audit firms affect earnings positively with respect to the detection of EM
activity (Davidson et al., 2005). Ye (2014) and Soliman, and Ragab (2014) found that the
firms audited by Big4 audit firm reported less EM. It is therefore hypothesized that:
H9. Big4 audit firms are positively associated with earnings quality.
4.8 Ownership concentration
Concentrated ownership can trigger agency problems, particularly in the case of high
ownership concentration which can limit the power to a few shareholders. This in turn may
lead to the expropriation of the interests of minority shareholders (Porta et al., 1999; Woidtke
and Yeh, 2013). This occurs when there is a close relationship between the largest
shareholders and managers. In most high ownership concentration, firm’s managers are
either members of the controlling shareholders or they have close personal relations. This
close relationship may direct managers to manage earnings toward the interest of the
majority at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002).
Fan and Wong (2002) reported that ownership concentration is related with lower
accounting conservatism and Kamardin and Haron (2011) indicated that concentrated
ownership among Malaysian firms facilitate conflict of interest between the two groups of
shareholders (minority and majority). The block ownership is found to be related to less
corporate governance effectiveness (Ntim et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2015), which in turn affects
firm value (Ntim et al., 2012a, 2012b). Meanwhile, Abdullah and Nasir (2004) and Abdul
Rahman and Ali (2006) provided evidence on the potential influence of concentrated
ownership on the independence of the board. Thus, based on the above findings and
considering the agency theory, we propose that:
H10. Ownership concentration is negatively associated with earnings quality.




































The population of this study comprises 822 firms listed in the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia
for the years 2009 to 2012. The study considered data from 2009, as it was the initial year
wherein the cost of investment in IAF was disclosed following its mandate by the Bursa
Malaysia. To obtain suitable homogeneity of the data, the study follows previous studies by
excluding 51 financial-related companies and unit trust firms (Yatim et al., 2006; Yunos
et al., 2010), 124 firms with an uncompleted online annual report among the study period
and 139 companies that have missing data of the study variables. As a consequence, the
final sample was 508 firms. Data collection was conducted through data stream and annual
reports available in the website of Bursa Malaysia. The details of the sample based on the
industries are presented in Table I.
5.1 Measurement of earnings quality
The main factor that auditors believe that lead to poor quality in financial reporting is EM,
that is, poor corporate governance (Tasios and Bekiaris, 2012). Ismail et al. (2009)
described EQ as the absence of EM. Accrual-based measures are widely accepted as
indicators of earning management activity (Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991;
Dechow et al., 1995; Becker et al., 1998). Also, Leuz et al. (2003) shows that EM is more
practiced in countries having high concentrated ownership. In particular, the controlling
shareholders prefer to use accruals to manipulate earnings to achieve the targeted
performance.
The total accruals include non-discretionary accruals (NDAs) and discretionary accruals
(DAs); the former is out of managers’ estimations, but the latter is under managers’
estimations and they can use it to manage earnings. Therefore, DA reflects EM, and to
separate NDA and DA, Jones (1991) put forward a model to calculate DA. Jones model
(1991) has been modified by some researchers (Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999;
Kothari et al., 2005; Yoon et al., 2006). DAs are often used as EQ proxy, and in this study,
two measures of DA are used to determine whether the results are consistent throughout
the models. First, DA1 was measured using the modified Jones model proposed by
Dechow et al. (1995), who added the change in accounts receivable and deducted it from
the change in revenue. This model has been extensively utilized in prior studies. Following
Dechow et al. (1995), the first step to calculate DA is to calculate total accruals (ACC) as
follows:
ACCit  EBXIit – CFOit (1)
where ACC is total accruals for specific firms in a specific year and industry which is equal
to the earnings before extraordinary items (EBXI) minus the cash flows from operations
(CFO), i is industry and t is the year. As the total accruals resulted from revenue and
operating activities, the ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-sectional analysis was ran to
the entire firm years and industries for the estimation of the fitted values (coefficients of a1,
a2 and a3)[1]. DA is then calculated from the residuals based on the following equation:
Table I Sample of study by industries
Industries Firms Observations %
Construction 30 120 6
Consumer 83 332 16
Industrial products 163 652 32
Plantation 33 132 6
Property 49 196 10
Technology 23 92 5
Trading and services 127 508 25
Total 508 2,032 100





































 a0  a1 1TAt1  a2REVit  RECitTAt1   a3 PPEitTAt1   (2)
where TA is the prior year total assets, REV is the change in revenue, REC is the change
in trade receivables, PPE is the property, plant and equipment and  is the error term.
This study follows Dechow et al.’s (1995) suggestion in terms of deducting the change in
accounts receivable from the change in revenues prior to the estimation. The industry- and
year-specific aspect is then used for the estimation of parameter estimates (coefficients a0,
a1, a2, and a3), which is calculated from equation (2), and then, the NDAs are obtained
following equation (3):
NDAit  a0  a1 1TAt1  a2REVit  RECitTAt1   a3 PPEitTAt1 (3)
The total DA (residuals) is obtained from the difference between the estimation in equation
(3) and the actual accruals as presented in the following equation:
DAit  ACCit – NDAit (4)
where NDA is non-discretionary accrual and DA is discretionary accrual. The second
discretionary accrual (DA2) measurement followed the extended modified Jones model
proposed by Yoon et al. (2006). This is because Yoon et al.’s (2006) study in the context of
Bangladesh reported that the modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) is
not robust to be used for Asian firms. According to Yoon et al.’s (2006) model, the total
accruals are linked to the cash revenue/sales changes, the cash expenses changes and
non-cash expenses, such as depreciation expenses changes, and the changes in the




 a0  a1REVit  RECitREVit   a2EXPit  PAYitREVit 
 a3DEPit  RETitREVit   
(5)
where EXP is the change in sum of cost of goods sold and selling and general
administrative expenses excluding non-cash expenses, PAY is the change in accounts
payable, DEP is the depreciation expenses and RET is retirement benefits expenses. DA is





 a0  a1REVit  RECitREVit   a2EXPit  PAYitREVit 
 a3DEPit  RETitREVit 
(6)
The absolute value of discretionary accruals |DA| in the two measurements reflects the EM
practices, as EM can either be income-increasing or income-decreasing. According to
Bedard and Johnstone (2004), Klein (2002) and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), the absolute
value of DA functions as an effective proxy for the total effect of income-increasing and
income-decreasing EM and, as such, the high absolute value of DA represent low EQ and
vice versa.
The examination of the validity of DA measurement models is required before applying
these models, that is, the property, plant and equipment should have a negative
relationship with total accruals (because it determines the depreciation expenses). Table II
shows that the coefficient of property, plant and equipment has a negative relationship with
DA in both models. The coefficient of change in revenue is positive with DA1 and negative
with DA2, which is because the change in revenue is related to the increase or decrease
in total accruals. The extended model of Yoon et al. (2006) is presented in Table II. The
model is significant at 1 per cent level, with an explanatory power (R2) of 47.54 per cent.
This exceeds Dechow et al.’s (1995) model with 0.81 per cent. The R2 provides evidence



































on the ability of the extended model by Yoon et al. (2006) to capture DA of firms listed in
the Malaysian Main Market.
5.2 Discretionary accruals model specification
Specifically, the first model of this study attempts to examine the relationship between IAF, Big4
audit firm, AC independence and financial expertise, OWCO and EQ. Additionally, like prior
studies (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; Dechow et al., 2003; Ismail et al., 2009; Peasnell et al.,
2005), this study considers firm size, return on assets, leverage, income loss and sales growth
as control variables. Also, years and industries are considered as dummy variables to control
the effects and differences of business cycles throughout industries as recommended by Datta
et al. (2013). The proposed model used to achieve the study objectives is as follows:
DA  1ACIND  2ACEXPERT  3IAFINV  4IAFSOUR  5BIG4
 6OWCO  7ROA  8LEV  9FSIZE  10LOSS
 11SGROWTH  12YEARS  13INDUSTRIES  e
(7)
where |DA| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, ACIND is the AC
independence, ACEXPERT is the audit committee’s financial expertise, IAFINV is the
cost of internal audit function, IAFSOUR is the internal audit function sourcing
arrangements, BIG4 is the big 4 audit firms, OWCO is the ownership concentration,
ROA is the return on assets, LEV is the leverage, FSIZE is the firm size, LOSS is the net
loss and SGROWTH is the sales growth.
Therefore, to examine the moderating effect on the relationship of AC’s independence and
expertise on IAF (sourcing arrangements and investment in IAF) and EQ, this study applies
the second model below:
DA  1ACIND  2ACEXPERT  3IAFINV  4IAFSOUR
 5ACIND 	 IAFINV  6ACIND 	 IAFSOUR
 7ACEXPERT 	 IAFINV  8ACEXPERT 	 IAFSOUR  9BIG4
 10OWCO  11ROA  12LEV  13FSIZE  14LOSS
 15SGROWTH  16YEARS  17INDUSTRIES  e (8)
The summary of the study variables’ measurements are presented in Table III.
6. Empirical findings and discussion
The descriptive statistics of the continuous variables are presented in Table IV and those
of the dichotomous variables are presented in Table V. Specifically, in Table IV, the
statistics shows that on average, 88 per cent of the audit committee members are
independent, and 47.47 per cent of them are financial experts. A marked increase is noted
in ACIND and ACEXPERT in this study as compared to the finding in the study by Yunos
et al. (2010), where the former and the latter were found to be 70 and 37 per cent,
Table II Multiple regression results of discretionary accruals measurements
Variables
M-Jones by Dechow et al.
(1995) Extended M-Jones by Yoon et al. (2006)
Coefficient t-statistics Variables Coefficient t-statistics
_cons 0.0110** 2.31 _cons 0.0852 1.57
1/TA 485.35 1.31 (REV– REC)/REV 0.092*** 19.91
(REV–REC)/TA 0.0112 1.06 ( EXP–PAY)/REV 0.1321*** 23.50





Note: *, **, *** are significant levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively



































respectively, using data from the years 2001-2007. Such an increase might be attributed to
the revised MCCG 200 for the domination of independent directors in the AC of the listed
firms. Therefore, the independent members’ dominance in the audit committee in this study
is evidenced by the 67 per cent minimum level of independence.
Table IV shows that the average IAF investment is 11.41, which equals to RM370,658, with
the least value of 8.92 (RM3000) and the highest of 15.61 (RM39,000,000). These results
show a clear effort by the listed firms towards investing in IAF to improve internal control,
the quality of earnings and the financial reporting quality in the listed firms in the Malaysian
Main Market. Furthermore, the firms’ shares are concentrated among the largest five
shareholders with an average of 54.24 per cent, indicating that the majority of the shares
are held by few shareholders (high concentration of ownership).
Table III Summary of variables measurement
Variables Measurement
ACIND Percentage of total number of independent non-executive directors divided by the
total number of AC members (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; Mohamad et al., 2012)
ACEXPERT The ratio of audit committee members with accounting and financial knowledge to
total members of AC (Goh, 2009; Saleh et al., 2007; Zaman et al., 2011)
IAFINV The natural log of Internal audit cost (Johl et al., 2013; Yasin and Nelson, 2012)
IAFSOUR Equals “1”, if IAF is established in-house and “0” otherwise (Johl et al., 2013)
BIG4 Equals “1” if the firm is audited by Big4 auditors and “0” otherwise (Abdul Rahman
and Ali, 2006; Davidson et al., 2005; Ntim et al., 2013)
OWCO Ownership by largest five shareholders (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Al-Jaifi,
2015)
FSIZE Natural log of total assets (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; Ismail et al., 2009; Peasnell
et al., 2005)
LEV The ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Klein, 2002; Davidson et al., 2005)
ROA The annual net profit of individual firm before tax divided by total assets (Abdul
Rahman and Ali, 2006; Ismail et al., 2009; Ntim, 2015)
LOSS Dummy variable equals to “1” if the net income is loss and “0” otherwise (Dechow
et al., 2003)
SGROWTH Sales growth, annual sales growth (current year sales – prior year’s sales)/prior
year’s sales (Ahmed et al., 2002; Ntim et al., 2013)
Table IV Descriptive statistics of continuous variables
Variable name Minimum Maximum Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
DA1 0.002 0.195 0.056 0.050 1.266 4.028
DA2 0.007 1.452 0.256 0.338 2.258 7.801
IAFINV (log) 8.923 15.607 11.408 1.350 0.808 3.433
ACIND 0.667 1.000 0.885 0.150 0.581 1.423
ACEXPERT 0.200 1.000 0.475 0.202 0.910 3.013
OWCO 17.850 85.730 54.241 15.735 0.161 2.318
ROA 0.599 0.337 0.033 0.093 0.892 6.647
LEV 0.004 1.652 0.391 0.220 0.997 5.710
FSIZE (log) 10.402 17.453 12.897 1.440 0.863 3.692
SGROWTH 0.593 1.581 0.071 0.337 1.818 9.254
Notes: DA1 is discretionary accrual (DA)-modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995); DA2 is an
extension of modified Jones model by Yoon et al. (2006)
Table V Descriptive statistics of dichotomous variables
Variable name Observations
Frequency %
1 0 1 0
IAFSOUR 2,032 937 1,095 46.10 53.90
BIG4 2,032 1,135 897 55.90 44.10
LOSS 2,032 438 1,594 21.60 78.40



































The descriptive statistics in Table V indicate that 46.1 per cent of the Main Market listed
firms in Malaysia employ in-house IAF, while the remaining 53.9 per cent outsource their
audit function. Added to this, 55.9 per cent of the firms are audited by the Big4, while the
remaining 44.1 per cent are audited by non-Big4 firms. With regards to the controlled
variables, the companies’ sizes differ from a minimum of 10.4 to a maximum of 17.45. The
average leverage level of the sample is 39 per cent with a ROA of 3.3 per cent – the
negative sign Kasznik shows losses in some firms. The firms have an average sales growth
of 7 per cent, with some having a negative value, indicating that the revenue of the current
year is lower as compared to that of the previous year. The figures in Table V also show that
21.6 per cent of the firms reported net income loss.
As with prior studies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Bonetti et al., 2013; Gaio, 2010; Kothari
et al., 2005; Kraft et al., 2014; Prawitt et al., 2009; Saleh et al., 2007; Yoon et al., 2006), this
study carried out Winsorized distributions to prevent potential outliers from occurring in the
entire continuous variables at the top and bottom 1 per cent of the data distribution. This
approach also assists in maintaining the original data’s characteristics. Added to this, a
thorough standard error test was carried out to estimate the regression model to handle
possible problem of heteroskedasticity. In relation to this, the normality assumption was
tested with the help of skewness and kurtosis, where a higher threshold of 3 was used for
skewness as recommended by Hair et al. (2006). As for kurtosis, a higher threshold of 10
was used as suggested by Kline (1998). Table IV presents the detailed results of the
process, indicating the normal distribution of the data set. Furthermore, to confirm the
absence of multicollinearity, the correlation matrix between variables was examined
through the Pearson correlation. Table VI shows that no correlation exceeds 0.80, which
indicates the non-existence of multicollinearity issue (Hair et al., 2006).
Data analysis was conducted using OLS regression, through which the model fit was found
to be significant for the first dependent variable (DA1) at the significant level of 1 per cent
(F-value  6.55, R2  0.0755). As for the second dependent variable (DA2), the model fit
was also found to be significant at the significant level of 1 per cent (with F-value  20.196,
R2  0.2426).
Based on the results presented in Table VII, the cost of IAF (IAFINV) was found to be
insignificantly related to DA1, but significantly and negatively related to DA2 at the
significance level of 1 per cent (t  2.97, p  0.01), indicating that H1 is supported. The
underlying implication of the finding is that an increasing investment in IAF would lead to
increased monitoring and decreased EM, which, in turn, could result in higher EQ. In other
words, increasing investment in IAF is an effective way to improve internal monitoring.
These results support the agency theory and resource dependence theory, as IAF is an
effective resource to enhance firm’s monitoring device to decrease the agency problem
between managers and financial reporting users. This contention is supported by Prawitt
et al. (2009) and Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015a, 2015b). Moving on to the second
hypothesis, the results in Table VII show an insignificant relationship between sourcing
arrangements (IAFSOUR) and both DA1 and DA2, indicating that H2 is rejected. This result
is supported by Johl et al. (2013). Also, the table presents a negative and significant
relationship between ACIND and DA1 (t  1.74, p  0.10), indicating that H3 is
supported. Such result is also supported by both the agency theory and the resource
dependence theory as both posit that ACIND are effective monitoring devices to facilitate
the acquisition of external resource in an effort to improve the quality of financial reporting.
Prior studies reported similar results (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005;
Sharma and Kuang, 2014; Saleh et al., 2007; Mansor et al., 2013; Al-Rassas and Kamardin,
2015a). With regards to the relationship between ACIND and DA2, the analysis revealed an
insignificant relation.
In terms of ownership concentration (OWCO), the coefficient is significantly and positively
associated with DA1 (t  2.89, p  0.01). Thus, H10 is supported. This result suggests the
influence of OWCO on EQ, which supports the agency theory. On the other hand, Table VII







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shows an insignificant association with DA2, while the Big4 audited firms significantly
associated with DA1 (t  1.9, p  0.1), which supports the argument that high external
audit quality, as a monitoring mechanism, decreases DA (high EQ). Thus, H9 is supported.
This result is similar to the finding of Soliman and Ragab (2014). With regards to the
relationship between Big4 audit firm and DA2, the results show an insignificant coefficient.
In addition, the result indicates that AC’s expertise (ACEXPERT) is not related to EQ and
thus rejects H6. This result is consistent with the study of Mohamad et al. (2012).
With regards to control variables, the ROA coefficient was found to be significantly negative
for DA1 at the significance level of 5 per cent and for DA2 at the significant level of 1 per
cent. The results evidenced a positive relationship between firm performance and EQ, a
result aligned with that reported by Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), who found
low-performing firms to have a greater inclination towards adopting EM. Added to this,
leverage (LEV) was evidenced to positively and significantly relate to DA1 at the
significance level of 1 per cent, showing that firms that are highly leveraged are more prone
to engaging in EM to steer clear of violating their debt covenant. Also, the results showed
the negative and significant relationship of firm size with DA1 at the significance level of 1
per cent. This indicates that large firms report higher EQ, as they are strictly overseen by
the firms’ financial processes. Meanwhile, sales growth (SGROWTH) was found to have a
positive and significant relationship with DA1 at 1 per cent significance level and had a
negative significant relationship with DA2 at 10 per cent significance level. This is aligned
with the results reported by Warfield et al. (1995) that showed increasing sales growth to
facilitate EM among managers. Moreover, loss was found to have a significant and positive
relationship with DA2 at the significance level of 5 per cent, indicating that firms with loss
net income possess high DA and thus low EQ.
According to Aiken and West (1991), to detect moderator effects, an interaction term must
be created. The interaction term is the product of multiplying the predictor variable with the
Table VII First model: multiple regression results (OLS)
DA  1ACIND  2ACEXPERT  3IAFINV  4IAFSOUR  5BIG4
 6OWCO  7ROA  8LEV  9FSIZE  10LOSS  11SGROWTH
 12YEARS  13INDUSTRIES  e
Variables Predicted sign
DA1 DA2
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
_cons  0.10017*** 6.02 0.31381*** 3.69
IAFINV  0.00123 0.71 0.02964*** 2.97
IAFSOUR  0.00321 0.98 0.02691 1.50
ACIND  0.01478* 1.74 0.03692 0.86
ACEXPERT  0.00522 0.83 0.03443 1.06
BIG4  0.00518* 1.90 0.01405 0.93
OWCO  0.00024*** 2.89 0.000326 0.78
ROA  0.07537* 1.94 0.63268*** 3.48
LEV  0.02069*** 2.60 0.01864 0.45
FSIZE  0.00433*** 3.02 0.00742 0.96
LOSS  0.00570 1.23 0.05878** 2.12
SGROWTH  0.01258*** 2.61 0.04363* 1.71
YEARS  Include Include





Notes: *, **, *** are significant levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; DA1 is DA-modified Jones model
(Dechow et al., 1995); DA2 is an extension of modified Jones model by Yoon et al. (2006); ACIND
is AC independence; ACEXPERT is AC financial expertise; IAFINV is investment in internal audit
function; IAFSOUR is sourcing arrangements of internal audit function; BIG4 is largest four audit
firms; OWCO is ownership concentration; ROA is return on assets; LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm
size; LOSS is net loss and SGROWTH is sales growth



































moderator variable. After interaction terms have been created, everything should be in
place to structure a multiple regression equation using STATA to test moderator effects.
Accordingly, Table VIII shows that for the first dependent variable (DA1), the model is fit
and significant at 1 per cent level (with F-value  5.98, R2  0.0773), and for the second
dependent variable (DA2), the model is also fit and significant at 1 per cent level (with
F-value  17.85, R2  0.2486).
As shown in Table VIII, the interaction of ACIND and investment in IAF (ACIND  IAFINV)
is negatively significant at 10 per cent level (t  1.99, p  0.10) and at 1 per cent level
(t  3.71, p  0.01) with DA1 and DA2, respectively. These results indicate that an
increased investment in IAF decreases DA depending on the effectiveness of ACIND.
Thus, H4 is supported. Hence, ACIND moderates the relationship between investment in
IAF and DA. Also, the coefficient of ACIND  IAFSOUR is positively significant at 5 per cent
level with DA2 (t  2.2, p  0.05), which indicates that ACIND plays a moderating effect in
the relationship between IAF sourcing arrangements and DA2. Thus, H5 is supported. This
can be attributed to the fact that increases in ACIND with regards to in-house IAF lead to
increased EM (low EQ) and the increases in ACIND with regards to outsourcing IAF lead
to decreased EM (high EQ).
Table VIII indicates that the coefficients of the interaction in AC’s expertise with sourcing
arrangements of IAF (ACEXPRT  IAFSOUR) and DA2 is significant and negative at the
significance level of 10 per cent (t  1.72, p  0.10). This indicates that the AC’s
expertise moderates the relationship between in-house IAF and DA2. Thus, H8 is
Table VIII Second model: Multiple regression results of moderating effect of audit
committee
DA  1ACIND  2ACEXPERT  3IAFINV  4IAFSOUR  5ACIND 	 IAFINV
 6ACIND 	 IAFSOUR  7ACEXPERT 	 IAFINV  8ACEXPERT 	 IAFSOUR
 9BIG4  10OWCO  11ROA  12LEV  13FSIZE  14LOSS  15SGROWTH
 16YEARS  17INDUSTRIES  e
Variables Predicted sign
DA1 DA2
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
_cons  0.0270 0.4 0.72068** 2.48
ACIND  0.127* 1.83 1.17636*** 3.67
ACEXPERT  0.0101 0.23 0.01050 0.05
IAFINV  0.0126** 2.03 0.06603** 2.48
IAFSOUR  0.0144 0.73 0.12074 1.30
ACIND  IAFINV  0.0128** 1.99 0.10868*** 3.71
ACIND  IAFSOUR  0.0160 0.8 0.22968** 2.20
ACEXPERT  IAFINV  0.000758 0.19 0.00339 0.17
ACEXPERT  IAFSOUR  0.00715 0.49 0.12463* 1.72
BIG4  0.00526* 1.95 0.01543 1.02
OWCO  0.000228*** 2.73 0.00019 0.45
ROA  0.0968*** 4.57 0.66967*** 3.69
LEV  0.0144** 2.01 0.01114 0.27
FSIZE  0.00400*** 2.79 0.00867 1.13
LOSS  0.00202 0.56 0.05187* 1.87
SGROWTH  0.0144*** 3.01 0.04339* 1.70
YEARS  Include Include





Notes: *, **, *** are significant levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; DA1 is DA-modified Jones model
(Dechow et al., 1995); DA2 is an extension of modified Jones model by Yoon et al. (2006); ACIND
is AC independence; ACEXPERT is AC financial expertise; IAFSOUR is sourcing arrangements of
internal audit function; IAFINV is investment in internal audit function; BIG4 is largest four audit firms;
OWCO is ownership concentration; ROA is return on assets; LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm size;
LOSS is net income loss and SGROWTH is sales growth



































supported. However, Table VIII also shows that the interaction of AC’s expertise and
investment in IAF is insignificant, indicating that the AC’s expertise does not moderate the
relationship between investment in IAF and DA1. Thus, H7 is rejected.
For the robustness test, we re-estimated the first model (Table VII) using different
measurements for some variables. Measurement for ACIND was changed to dummy
variable that equals “1” if all AC members are independent and “0” otherwise. IAFINV was
measured by the percentage of the cost of IAF to firm size. In addition, OWCO was
measured by the largest ten shareholders. Table IX shows that the results, in general, are
similar to the results in Table VII. We also reran our model using firm-level fixed effect
approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity and also using random effect approach,
which assumed that the years’ error term is not correlated with the predictors allowing for
time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. Tables X and XI show that
majority of the results from fixed effect and random effect approaches are similar to the
results in the OLS pooled approach.
7. Summary and conclusion
The objective of the study is to examine the effect of AC’s independence and financial
expertise, internal and external audit, ownership concentration and their association with
EQ in the emerging market. The results provided evidence that AC’s independence,
investment in IAF and Big4 audit firm are related to higher EQ. Also, the study found
ownership concentration to be associated with lower EQ. Moreover, the result reported an
insignificant relationship between AC’s financial expertise, sourcing arrangements of IAF
and EQ. The study also found evidence that AC’s independence moderated the
relationship between IAF (investment and sourcing arrangements) and EQ. In addition,
AC’s financial expertise was found to moderate the relationship between sourcing
arrangements of IAF and EQ. This study has added to the understanding of the agency
theory and resource dependence theory in an emerging developing country, where firms
Table IX First model: Multiple regression results using different measurements
DA  1ACIND  2ACEXPERT  3IAFINV  4IAFSOUR  5BIG4  6OWCO
 7ROA  8LEV  9FSIZE  10LOSS  11SGROWTH
 12YEARS  13INDUSTRIES  e
Variables Predicted sign
DA1 DA2
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
_cons  0.0853*** 5.75 0.282*** 3.69
ACIND  0.00508* 1.91 0.0118 0.87
ACEXPERT  0.00493 0.79 0.0433 1.33
IAFINV  0.00332* 1.84 0.0187* 1.89
IAFSOUR  0.00327 1.16 0.00666 0.42
BIG4  0.00519* 1.91 0.0176 1.17
OWCO  0.000221** 2.4 0.000175 0.38
ROA  0.0733* 1.89 0.611*** 3.31
LEV  0.0208*** 2.63 0.0113 0.27
FSIZE  0.00303*** 2.82 0.0120** 2.11
LOSS  0.00577 1.25 0.0641** 2.3
SGROWTH  0.0125*** 2.59 0.0445* 1.71
YEARS  Include Include




Notes: *, **, *** are significant levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; DA1 is DA-modified Jones model
(Dechow et al., 1995); DA2 is an extension of modified Jones model (Yoon et al., 2006); ACIND is AC
independence; ACEXPERT is AC financial expertise; IAFSOUR is sourcing arrangements of internal
audit function; IAFINV is investment in internal audit function; BIG4 is largest four audit firms; OWCO
is ownership concentration; ROA is return on assets; LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm size; LOSS is net
loss and SGROWTH is sales growth



































are following the recommendations of code of corporate governance and are controlled by
high ownership concentration, in which the agency relationships are complex. To this end,
the results of the study provide practical implications that are expected to help investors,
regulators and market participants. Policymakers might use the findings regarding EQ to
Table X First model: Multiple regression results using fixed effect and random effect
DA  1ACIND  2ACEXPERT  3IAFINV  4IAFSOUR  5BIG4  6OWCO  7ROA  8LEV
 9FSIZE  10LOSS  11SGROWTH  12YEARS  13INDUSTRIES  e
Variables Predicted sign
DA1 DA2
Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Random effect
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
_cons  0.107*** 11.13 0.100*** 10.70 0.261*** 6.77 0.315*** 8.49
ACIND  0.0162** 4.95 0.0148*** 4.45 0.0756 2.24 0.0392 1.39
ACEXPERT  0.00533 1.09 0.00522 1.00 0.0438 1.20 0.037 1.01
IAFSOUR  0.00322 2.11 0.00321*** 3.49 0.0121 0.85 0.0276** 2.02
IAFINV  0.00167 1.05 0.00123 1.11 0.0298** 5.13 0.0288*** 4.23
BIG4  0.00632** 3.83 0.00518** 2.56 0.0305* 2.51 0.0153 1.30
OWCO  0.000213** 3.22 0.000242*** 4.63 0.00147** 3.55 0.000308 0.68
ROA  0.0761** 3.63 0.0754*** 3.19 0.485** 5.24 0.602*** 7.92
LEV  0.0221 2.02 0.0207** 2.11 0.077 1.26 0.0172 0.31
FSIZE  0.00513*** 6.07 0.00433*** 5.76 0.0199** 3.88 0.00654 1.58
LOSS  0.00594 1.83 0.0057 1.63 0.0629 1.87 0.0618*** 3.51
SGROWTH  0.0134 2.02 0.0126** 2.02 0.0543*** 6.35 0.0476** 2.29
YEARS  Not include Include Not include Include
INDUSTRIES  Not include Include Not include Include
R2 within 0.064 0.0715 0.0482 0.2419
N 2,032 2,032 2,036 2,036
Notes: *, **, *** are significant levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; DA1 is DA-modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995); DA2 is and
extension of modified Jones model (Yoon et al., 2006); ACIND is AC independence; ACEXPERT is AC financial expertise; IAFSOUR is
sourcing arrangements of internal audit function; IAFINV is investment in internal audit function; BIG4 is largest four audit firms; OWCO
is ownership concentration; ROA is return on assets; LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm size; LOSS is net loss and SGROWTH is sales growth
Table XI Second model: Multiple regression results of interaction model using fixed effect and random effect
DA  1ACIND  2ACEXPERT  3IAFINV  4IAFSOUR  5ACIND 	 IAFINV  6ACIND 	 IAFSOUR  7 ACEXPERT 	 IAFINV
 8ACEXPERT 	 IAFSOUR  9BIG4  10OWCO  11ROA  12LEV  13FSIZE  14LOSS  15SGROWTH





Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Random effect
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
_cons  0.000445 0.02 0.00445 0.18 0.831** 2.34 0.714** 2.24
ACIND  0.110** 3.59 0.103*** 3.05 1.171*** 3.15 1.173*** 3.52
ACEXPERT  0.0169 0.41 0.00724 0.17 0.199 0.70 0.0154 0.06
IAFSOUR  0.0132 1.38 0.0155* 1.78 0.0383 0.33 0.124 1.20
IAFINV  0.0114** 5.03 0.0109*** 5.49 0.0672** 2.01 0.0665** 2.21
BIG4  0.00643** 3.82 0.00532** 2.54 0.0311* 1.91 0.0167 1.13
OWCO  0.000198** 3.20 0.000227*** 4.69 0.00131*** 2.71 0.000172 0.39
ACIND  IAFINV?  0.0116** 4.35 0.0110*** 3.75 0.102*** 2.92 0.108*** 3.48
ACIND  IAFSOUR  0.0151 1.74 0.0171** 2.10 0.142 1.17 0.235** 2.16
ACEXPERT  IAFINV  0.00137 0.34 0.000494 0.12 0.0142 0.54 0.00369 0.16
ACEXPERT  IAFSOUR  0.00793 0.56 0.00666 0.47 0.164* 1.91 0.127* 1.65
ROA  0.0801** 3.55 0.0791*** 3.16 0.533*** 4.15 0.639*** 5.52
LEV  0.0214 1.95 0.0199** 2.04 0.0848** 2.24 0.00973 0.28
FSIZE  0.00507** 5.64 0.00425*** 5.56 0.0212** 2.56 0.00782 1.01
LOSS  0.00518 1.43 0.00500 1.28 0.0545** 2.15 0.0549** 2.41
SGROWTH  0.0134 2.05 0.0126** 2.07 0.0539** 2.40 0.0474** 2.35
YEARS  Not include Include Not include Include
INDUSTRIES  Not include Include Not include Include
R2 within 0.064 0.0733 0.0563 0.2479
N 2,032 2,032 2,036 2,036
Notes: *, **, *** are significant levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; DA1 is DA-modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995); DA2 is an extension of modified
Jones model (Yoon et al., 2006); ACIND is AC independence; ACEXPERT is AC financial expertise; IAFSOUR is sourcing arrangements of internal audit
function; IAFINV is investment in internal audit function; BIG4 is largest four audit firms; OWCO is ownership concentration; ROA is return on assets; LEV
is leverage; FSIZE is firm size; LOSS is net loss and SGROWTH is sales growth



































recognize the important role played by the internal and external audit and AC in enhancing
the EQ. The significant results on the moderating effect support that due to more investment
in internal audit function in situations under which there is high AC independence and
financial expertise, the AC is able to enforce management to increase EQ, which in turn
would ultimately lead to a high quality of financial reporting. Nevertheless, this study’s
scope is confined to the Malaysian Main Market listed firms for a period of four years
(2009-2012), and as such, the researchers recommend that future studies embark on
examining other potential influential variables and measurements to gauge the
effectiveness of the internal and external audit function and AC.
Note
1. To calculate discretionary accruals, we run 28 OLS multiple regressions (specific year and
industry) for both models.
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